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Abstract 
Economists typically celebrate productivity growth as the chief way to improve living 
standards. They also advocate that particular cities and regions strive to be as productive as 
possible to attract business and increase employment. However, while productivity growth 
may reduce costs, improve quality, or lead to innovation and new products, if demand is 
insufficiently elastic, labor demand may decrease, reducing employment in that location. In 
other words, places experiencing the most productivity growth may face some unintended 
consequences, such as weakening of local labor markets. In this paper, we study county-
level effects of productivity growth and productivity levels in the computer and electronic 
product manufacturing industry (NAICS334), the goods sector (excluding NAICS334) and 
in the services sector on total employment growth, employment growth in major sectors, 
income and earnings growth. The results suggest that productivity growth generally 
suppresses job growth but has boosting effects on earnings and, to a lesser degree, on per-
capita income, although there is considerable variation across geographies and specific 
outcomes.  
 
Key words: local productivity growth, local productivity level, employment growth, 
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product manufacturing 
  
	 1	
I. Introduction 
Economists typically celebrate productivity growth as central to improving living 
standards and developing new products for the general population. Elementary economics 
textbooks describe that while productivity has increased remarkably since the 19th century, 
so have total employment and living standards (Case et al., 2012). The neoclassical 
economic theory predicts that there should be a comparable increase in wages as 
productivity grows. It is unsurprising, then, that at the local and regional levels improved 
productivity and innovation are viewed as a prerequisite for future growth and development 
that is needed for regional competitiveness (e.g., Combes et al., 2004).  
Recent research, however, increasingly shifts to explore and document both the 
positive and negative effects of productivity growth and automation. There is no question 
that consumers benefit from better and less expensive products that are due to improved 
productivity. It is highly probable that the global benefits of productivity growth exceed its 
global costs. Yet, even if aggregate jobs are created on net as a result of productivity 
growth, there still could be net job losses that are locally concentrated in the very places 
where the production occurs as the economy reorganizes. Autor and Salomons (2017), for 
instance, show that productivity growth boosts country-level employment, but productivity 
gains within an industry lead to contraction of that industry.  
Given the tendency for many industries to be spatially concentrated, negative 
effects of productivity growth are likely to be felt more strongly in localities where 
productive industries locate. In other words, the costs and benefits of productivity growth 
are not uniformly distributed across space. Places where the productivity growth is taking 
place may suffer on balance if productivity growth leads to job losses and/or the profits are 
extricated elsewhere (e.g., to a firm’s global shareholders)—i.e., the benefits are globally 
dispersed to consumers and owners elsewhere, while the costs are concentrated in place of 
production. Indeed, there are growing concerns that the sanguine story about productivity 
growth is less applicable in the current environment as “losing” regions are not 
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compensated to offset their losses.  
The argument that productivity growth and innovation may kill jobs is by no means 
new. Ricardo voiced his concerns about the end of work long time ago (Ricardo, 1821). 
Neisser (1942) discussed the tradeoffs of productivity growth in what was then commonly 
labeled as increases in technological unemployment. These concerns gained traction 
against the backdrop of sluggish job growth after 2000 and the post-Great Recession’s 
weak recovery for a number of reasons. New-economy firms such as Apple, Google, and 
Facebook create immense wealth while creating far fewer jobs than the old manufacturing 
industries of decades past. The changing relationship between wages and productivity may 
further suggest a new economic order. Since the 1970s, median U.S. wages have greatly 
lagged productivity growth, a break from the well-established link between productivity 
and wages in the early part of the 20th century (Krugman, 2015; Mishel and Gee, 2012). 
Similarly, U.S. manufacturing productivity growth has long been associated with a 
declining workforce, even well before the introduction of digital technologies and 
expansion of trade with low-wage nations. To illustrate, Figure 1 shows the time trend of 
US manufacturing output and manufacturing employment over the 1950-2016 period. It 
shows that during this time, production rose nearly seven-fold while employment fell by 
12%, implying a 778% increase in average labor productivity. Since 2000, these data 
suggest a 171% increase in average labor productivity but also a decline in employment.  
Recent evidence suggests that higher-order computer technologies allow for 
automation of many abstract tasks (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2012; Krugman, 2012; 
Smith, 2013; Ford, 2015; Tufekci, 2015; Council of Economic Advisors, 2016) and these 
technologies apply across a wide range of goods- and service-producing industries. For 
example, Frey and Osborne (2013) contend that 47% of jobs are at risk of being displaced 
by new technologies in the next decade or two. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) argue that 
displacement effects can potentially be large. They find that between 1990-2007, one more 
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industrial robot per-thousand workers reduces the local employment/population ratio by 
0.18-0.34 percentage points and lowers wages by 0.25-0.5 percent. While such estimates 
seem quite high, even if overestamated, they may herald possible dire effects. 
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Output in Manufacturing in the United States 
(DISCONTINUED) [USAOTPT], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USAOTPT; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Manufacturing Sector: Real 
Output [OUTMS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OUTMS; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees: Manufacturing 
[MANEMP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MANEMP 
In addition, other factors are creating pressures on low- and middle-skilled workers. 
For example, in addition to skill-biased technological change that has generally favored 
high-skilled workers since the 1970s, labor market polarization puts those in routine 
occupations at risk of being replaced by technology (e.g., Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et 
al., 2015; Autor et al., 2003; Beaudry et al., 2010), leading to an increase in income 
inequality. In fact, Hershbein and Kahn (2016) find that this polarization accelerated during 
the Great Recession due to a combination of labor hoarding and an opportunity to upgrade 
technology during the downturn. Beaudry et al., (2010) and Beaudry et al., (2016) find that 
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since 2000, the demand for high-skilled (cognitive tasked) workers has declined, pushing 
them down the occupational chain, creating even more pressure for middle-skilled workers.  
Despite the long-brewing debate, there is no consensus on the relationship between 
productivity and job growth  at the national level (Sabadash, 2013), let alone the local 
level, which is the purpose of our research. There has been significant research on how 
productivity and technological change affect aggregate employment (or unemployment), 
wages, and income distribution. For example, utilizing the argument that agglomeration 
economies increase productivity, Cingano and Schivardi (2004) show that larger cities have 
higher wages stemming from higher productivity, but not necessarily more job growth. Yet, 
research on the impact of total productivity growth on local labor markets (as opposed to 
national labor markets) is scarce.  A number of studies looked at the local effects of 
particular technological innovations, such as computerization or robots, but none on overall 
productivity growth, which can vary for a host of reasons including capital deepening or 
simple learning-by-doing. From the viewpoint of a worker who loses her job to 
productivity growth, it is unlikely that the exact reason (robots or simple production 
changes, for example) matters much. In this respect, an examination of overall productivity 
growth is useful so that findings from subsets of productivity growth drivers (e.g., robots) 
are not used to overgeneralize aggregate productivity growth effects.  
In contrast to the existing literature, we more directly examine how overall 
productivity levels and productivity growth affect regional labor markets; what are the 
relative contributions of productivity growth and productivity levels in computer and 
electronic manufacturing industries, goods and services and whether having a mix of high-
productivity industries is beneficial. As opposed to narrower studies of the effects of (say) 
robots or computerization, we are among the first to directly assess the relation between 
local-level overall productivity and a range of outcomes including jobs, earnings, and 
income growth. The exception is Hornbeck and Moretti (2018) (hereafter HM), though 
there are key differences between their study and ours. First, our model directs us to use 
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average labor productivity (ALP), while HM use total factor productivity (TFP). Second, 
HM are more interested in individual distributional outcomes, while we are more interested 
in the relative effects on local labor markets, especially differing productivity effects across 
sectors and how productivity growth in different sectors may have different effects1. Third, 
our focus is counties versus MSAs. A county focus allows us to consider rural areas, which 
have drawn more attention after President Trump’s election. Fourth, there are key 
specification differences. Namely, we first difference the variables in our specification in 
order to eliminate omitted county fixed effects; we emphasize three-year shocks versus 
HM’s focus on long-term 10-year shocks; and our post-2000 analysis versus their analysis 
of pre-2000 data.  
In addition to studying the relationship between productivity and more traditional 
economic outcomes, such as total employment and income, we expand the focus of our 
analysis to include employment in high-tech vs. low-tech industries and in goods-
producing industries vs. services. We measure overall productivity growth and initial 1998 
productivity at a county level and perform individual analyses for rural, small metropolitan, 
and large metropolitan counties over the 2000 – 2015 period to account for differing 
agglomeration effects by city size.  
We then repeat the analyses using separate measures of productivity for computer and 
electronic product manufacturing (NAICS334), goods (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, 
construction) and services instead of total productivity measures. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to appraise the effects of local productivity growth in computer 
and electronic product manufacturing on local employment, income, and earnings. 
II. Conceptual model 
Following Blien and Ludewig (2014) and Blien and Sanner’s (2014) use of the 
Appelbaum and Schettkat’s (1999) model, the following shows the tradeoffs of the 
																																																								
1 HM only consider manufacturing productivity. 
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substitution and compensation effects in the relationship between productivity growth and 
employment assuming Hicks neutral technological progress. Firm j’s average labor 
productivity  with employment N and output Q equals 
 ! = #/%          (1) 
where Q=f(P,y), fP<0 and fy<0; y is income and P is price (subscript j is dropped for 
convenience). The price markup z implies that & = '(/!            (2) 
Taking logs and differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to time and assuming the markup z 
is fixed in the short-run we arrive at (3) and (4). %̇ = #̇ − !̇          (3) &̇ = (̇ − !̇                (4) 
The total derivative of Q from the equation (1) is:  
 +# = ,-& + ,/+0          (5) 
After some algebraic manipulations and dividing both sides by Q we get: 
 #̇ = −1-2&̇ + 34̇                  (6) 
where 1-2is the own price elasticity and 3 is the income elasticity. In the last step, 
substitute (6) into (3) and substitute &̇ in (4) to derive the following: 
 %̇ = 51-2 − 17!̇ − 1-2(̇ + 34̇       (7)  
Assuming all j firms in industry i and region a are identical, we can write: %̇89 = 51-2 − 17!̇ − 1-2(̇89 + 34̇89       (8) 
Several insights follow from equation (8). Firstly, employment growth is positive if 
demand is elastic. This holds for monopolies and in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, but it is not 
necessarily the case in other settings (Blien and Sanner, 2014). Secondly, if wage growth 
equals productivity growth as suggested by the neoclassical economic theory, employment 
growth is expected to fall at the rate of productivity growth net of income growth. Rapid 
income growth in the economy should offset these productivity effects especially for 
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superior goods. For nearly the last five decades, however, U.S. wage growth has lagged 
behind productivity growth, meaning employment growth should increase. 
The model has been extended to include the following scenarios to show that 
demand must be elastic to ensure employment does not decline in response to productivity 
growth: 1) If labor supply is perfectly elastic in a regional setting (e.g. in a spatial 
equilibrium model), the results are not affected. Combes et al. (2004) show that even in the 
case of inelastically supplied labor, the results still hold, although the magnitude of the 
effect is reduced. 2) Introducing a wage curve structure produces similar dampening effects 
but the main conclusion holds. Blien and Sanner (2014) generalize the results to account 
for cross-price elasticities in other industries. 3) Assuming !̇ is equal across all industries to 
simplify things, %̇ = !̇(3 − 1) or employment only rises if output produced in the region is 
superior. Since 3 equals one on average, employment must fall in some industries in some 
regions. 
When examining the regional dimension of productivity empirically, it is important 
to keep in mind that local effects are unlikely to be identical to the effects at the national 
level. For instance, labor market effects are more concentrated when considering the fact 
that the place of production or industries in a region may have more elastic demand 
because regions have a smaller share of a given industry’s production. Another example 
would be a case when productivity growth reduces total industry employment across the 
nation but remaining employment may still concentrate in more productive regions. 
Expectations about changes in future productivity may affect contemporaneous migration 
patterns. Finally, if the capital owners benefit the most as a result of recent trends in 
productivity, while rents and dividends flow out of highly productive regions to the owners 
of capital (e.g., especially equity owners or absentee owners), the local benefits of 
productivity and innovation would be less pronounced.  
Our conceptual model follows a long literature that examines regional economic 
outcomes pioneered by Glaeser and co-authors (Glaeser et al., 1991; Glaeser et al., 2001; 
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Glaeser et al., 1995), which has been extended by many others including Betz et al. (2015) 
and Tsvetkova and Partridge (2016). A key underlying feature of our research is a spatial 
equilibrium framework (SEM) where indirect utility V in area a and firm profits are 
equalized across space in equilibrium, i.e. <8(. ) = <>(. ) with positive net migration into a 
if <8(. ) > <>(. ) and !8(. ) = !>(. ) with positive movements of firms and capital into a if !8(. ) > !>(. ). In this setup, V and ! are both functions of site-specific factors including 
amenities, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of a locality that affect 
household wellbeing and firm productivity (see HM for a more elaborate SEM framework).  
III. Empirical approach 
In operationalizing our conceptual model described above for empirical testing, the 
main difference of our estimation approach from past regional research is that, while using 
important determinants described in the literature as control variables, we augment the 
model with measures of productivity level and productivity growth.  
Productivity.  Starting in the mid-1990s, the U.S. economy enjoyed a surge in 
productivity growth led by information technology advances (Jorgenson et al., 2008; 
Ortega-Argilés, 2012; Van Ark et al., 2008). Yet, this productivity surge subsided shortly 
after 2000, increasing concerns that living standards will stagnate even as others 
increasingly worry about robots and ongoing automation. As noted above, however, 
productivity growth may have both positive and negative consequences for regional 
economic performance. Besides its ability to contribute to regional competitiveness, 
increased regional productivity may contribute to job loss and income inequality (Autor et 
al., 2015; Autor et al., 2008; Blien and Ludewig, 2014; Blien and Sanner, 2014; Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 1998; Vivarelli et al., 1996). By contrast, the level of productivity appears 
to have neutral or positive effects on regional outcomes, as it indicates a more competitive 
region that attracts firms and increases wages, though it could indicate industries that are in 
the process of shedding workers (HM do not consider productivity level effects). 
Existing research uses various measures of productivity, such as total factor 
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productivity, labor productivity, or exposure to computerization among others (Autor et al., 
2015; Del Gatto et al., 2011; Van Beveren, 2012). In this paper, we use two basic measures 
of county-level labor productivity, the imputed value-added-per-worker in the beginning of 
a period and imputed growth of value added per worker in a county. We employ average 
labor productivity because (1) it is what our theoretical model suggests and (2) it is the 
most appropriate measure for the analysis of labor productivity effects on local outcomes. 
We use the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) state-level data and divide value 
added by U.S. industry sectors by each sector’s employment to derive the state-level 
average value added per worker in each industry. Using data provided by the Upjohn 
Institute (Bartik, Biddle, Hershbein and Sotherland, 2018), we then use each county’s 
sectoral employment composition from County Business Patterns with suppressed values 
filled in using linear programming algorithm developed by Isserman and Westervelt (2006) 
to impute the initial level of productivity in a county and productivity growth over time.  
The formulas for the two measures are given below. Equation (1) shows how 
growth in value added per hour is calculated.   <@A(	CDE = ∑ G9CDEHI<@A(9DEHI,E9                                                                 (9) 
where G9CDEHI is employment share of sector i in county c (state s) in the previous year, 
and	<@A(9DEHI,E is the growth rate of value added per worker in state s’s sector i between 
years t-1 and t. We first-difference the productivity growth variable before inclusion in the 
models. The measure is essentially the expected growth in local productivity if productivity 
of all the county’s sectors grows at the corresponding state-level productivity growth rates. 
The VApW measure has the advantage of using state productivity growth to proxy for local 
productivity growth, which could be endogenous. Yet, as long as there is no labor supply 
response to the lagged industry structure after conditioning on the other control variables 
that also control for local labor supply, the growth of value added per worker should be 
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exogenous.2  
 The main potential disadvantage of this measure is that it is a proxy based on more 
general (aggregated) data, which we hope is mitigated by using state-level value added 
measures as opposed to the national ones. Still, if the state-level productivity measures are 
substantially different from county measures, they will introduce measurement error that 
can bias the coefficient to zero. If such a bias is present, our results would be conservative 
estimates.3 
A measure of productivity level in a county is given by equation (2) <@A(CDE = ∑ G9CDEKLM<@A(9DE9                                                                        (10) 
where <@A(CDE is the calculated added value per worker in county c (state s) in year t, G9CDE 
is identical to the above, and KLM<@A(9DE  is the logarithmic transformation of the state-
level value added per worker in sector i in year t. This measure is the county’s expected 
(logarithmically transformed) productivity level if all of its industries are as productive as 
their state-level counterparts (same caveats apply as in the case of the productivity growth 
proxy discussed in the previous paragraph).  The interpretation of the productivity change 
coefficients is simply the impact of a one-percent productivity shock. The descriptive 
statistics show the means of the productivity change variables are quite small (0.1% or 
less), but at the tails, the size of the shocks are quite large. 
 Both productivity measures are calculated using data for 39 sectors as reported by 
the BEA (the finest disaggregation available), which exclude government (NAICS92, 
Public Administration).4 Because these variables are based on the state-level trends, they 
can be considered exogenous in the analysis of productivity and its effects on economic 
outcomes at a county level. 
We include both productivity growth and productivity level (lagged by one year) in 																																																								2A	key	difference	with	HM	is	that	we	directly	incorporate	the	productivity	shock	term	in	our	model	while	they	use	a	similarly	constructed	measure	as	an	exogenous	instrument	for	TFP.		3HM	use	firm-level	data	to	construct	a	measure	of	local	TFP	from	the	Census	of	Manufacturers	to	obtain	a	local	measure,	in	which	estimating	firm-level	TFP	introduces	its	own	measurement	error	4	http://www.bls.gov/jlt/jltnaics.htm.	
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our models to explore potential variations in their effects on employment, earnings and 
income. The productivity growth variable is of the primary interest since it is consistent 
with the notion that the public is concerned about rising automation and outsourcing, which 
are affecting employment and wages. At the same time, a county’s lagged level of 
productivity can also play an additional role, though one that is of less interest in our case.  
The literature suggests that productivity growth is not uniform across industries 
(Ngai and Samaniego, 2011). Arguably, the most significant advances are taking place in 
computer and electronic product manufacturing (Houseman, Bartik and Sturgeon, 2015) 
and the goods sector (agriculture, mining, manufacturing and construction) in general, 
though some service sectors that are relatively more reliant on information technologies 
may enjoy significant productivity growth as well. To account for such heterogeneity, we 
perform additional analyses using separate productivity measures calculated for (1) 
computer and electronic product manufacturing, (2) goods sector excluding NAICS334, 
and (3) nongoods, or services, sector.  
Economic performance measures (dependent variables). Our models explain 
growth in employment, earnings and income, which are important indicators of local 
economic health, as a function of productivity, industrial composition and a set of other 
regional characteristics. More specifically, our main analysis focuses on total employment 
growth. Given the evidence, we expect unequal employment responses to changes in 
productivity across industries and so we also examine the following measures: employment 
growth in goods and services (separately); employment growth in high-tech and low-tech 
sectors (separately); per capita personal income growth (PCPI); average wage per job 
growth (AWPJ); and median household income growth.  
The high-tech/low-tech distinction follows Fallah et al. (2014) with agriculture, 
mining, construction, and manufacturing comprising the goods sector and all other sectors 
(except government) comprising services. Appendix Table A1 lists industries included in 
the high-tech category. We use an “unsuppressed” version of the County Business Patterns 
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dataset to calculate employment growth measures. In this version (provided by the W. E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment research), a linear programming algorithm developed by 
Isserman and Westervelt (2006) was applied to fill in values suppressed because of 
confidentiality requirements. AWPJ and PCPI measures were created using form CA4 from 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Median household income data come from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program.  All dependent and 
main explanatory variables (except for productivity levels) are first-differenced to account 
for county-level invariant characteristics that can plausibly drive the outcomes. Our 
analysis covers the 2000-2015 period. 
We start our analysis with employment because it has been a focus of intensive 
policy and scholarly debates, which are of significant interest to the public. Job growth is 
also a key determinant of other wellbeing indicators (Kofi, Hurst and Schwartz 2018). 
Employment can be linked to productivity growth via two offsetting effects (Sabadash, 
2013). On the one hand, new technologies and machinery may substitute for workers, 
increasing unemployment and/or dampening job growth (substitution effect). This may 
happen if, for example, productivity growth favors capital and is neutral for workers. For 
skill-based technological change (SBTC) at given input prices, this leads to substitution of 
high-skilled for low-skilled workers, in which the net employment effects can be negative.  
Technology-led productivity growth is also expected to increase unemployment if 
there are high costs of updating production technologies and those existing firms lay off 
workers (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998). Indeed, while it is possible that the new or 
dynamic firms in a highly productive industry are expanding, it is also possible that older, 
less dynamic firms in that industry may suffer, which would also be true for the locality 
where the latter companies are based—i.e., some of the positive gains could be offset 
elsewhere even if the industry is expanding overall. The so-called “end of work” argument 
brings this situation to extreme implying that technology will replace the need for most 
labor. Likewise, some of the substitution is across new and dying industries (a situation 
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reminiscent of replacement of horses by automobiles a century ago). As the old industries 
contract, structural unemployment for displaced workers increases.  
On the other hand, growing productivity may lead to a greater employment growth 
via compensation effects that economists typically regard as dominant. If new technologies 
sufficiently reduce production costs and prices, the demand surge should stimulate 
employment when product demand is elastic—i.e., the increase in demand has to be more 
than sufficient to offset the decrease in labor needed to produce a given level of output 
(Blien and Ludewig, 2014; Blien and Sanner, 2014). The invention of new goods and 
creation of new markets should also expand employment. Thus, the productivity growth-
employment relation on the net is an empirical question. 
The empirical evidence, indeed, finds divergent effects of productivity growth on 
employment, though most of the evidence is at the national/international level. For 
example, Autor and Salomon (2017) analyze the link between productivity growth and job 
creation in 19 countries at the national and industry levels and conclude that greater 
productivity leads to higher employment in national analyses, whereas productivity-
enhancing industries tend to shrink. In Germany, a positive relationship is observed in 
industries that face elastic demand and a negative one in industries with inelastic demand, 
in line with theoretical predictions (Blien and Ludewig, 2014). For the U.S., Cavelaars 
(2005) finds a positive relationship between labor productivity growth and job growth after 
1980, whereas Nordhaus (2005) finds a positive relation between productivity growth and 
employment in U.S. manufacturing.  
For Italy, Vivarelli and co-authors (Vivarelli et al., 1996) report increased 
employment in knowledge-based and capital goods-producing industries as a result of 
technological progress, while the relationship in other industries is the opposite. Several 
studies present evidence of a negative relationship (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008; 
Marquis and Trehan, 2010). Gallegati and co-authors attempt to reconcile divergent 
findings in the literature by arguing that productivity increases tend to displace jobs in the 
	 14	
short and medium runs and create long-run employment (Gallegati et al., 2014; Gallegati et 
al., 2015). Overall, the nature of an industry and its production processes determine if 
labor-saving or new product-creating consequences of a new technology and innovation 
dominate (Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010).  
We then turn our attention to another central measure of regional economic 
performance, namely income growth. In neoclassical economic theory, wage equals (the 
value of) marginal productivity of labor and we expect an approximately one-to-one 
increase in labor compensation as productivity rises. Whereas a post-war increase in 
productivity is well documented (Jorgenson et al., 2014; Ortega-Argilés, 2012), growth in 
real hourly median wage has lagged far behind (Mishel and Gee, 2012). We use three 
measures, namely growth in PCPI, AWPJ and median household income as dependent 
variables in addition to our employment growth measures. 
Estimation strategy. In our model, economic outcomes in county c, state s, during 
time period t are a function of the following vectors of variables: annual productivity 
growth (between years t-1 and t), lagged productivity levels in t-1, economic conditions 
which are measured by variables either lagged by one year (employment shares) or 
calculated annually (industry mix term), geography, demographics, and natural amenities. ∆OPQROSTCU = V + W∆XYZ[\YCU + ]XYZ[CEHI + ^_`ZaCb + c\_Z\C + d[_eZ\CIffg + hie_ajklC + mD + nCU                            (11) 
where o, p, q, r, s and t are coefficients or coefficient vectors; mD are state fixed effects 
(coefficients reflect average county variation within states); nCU is the residual clustered 
within BEA Economic Areas (173 total for nonmetro counties, 135 for counties in small 
MSAs and 65 for counties in large MSAs) to account for spatial autocorrelation. The next 
subsection gives more details on the control variables. 
We estimate equation (11) using OLS regression (an instrumental variable approach 
is also used as a sensitivity check below). The sample consists of 3,048 continental U.S. 
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counties. To avoid aggregation bias and to account for differing agglomeration effects, in 
line with the previous literature, we conduct the analyses separately for the following three 
groups: 2,231 nonmetropolitan counties, 382 counties that belong to metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) with a 1990 population of up to 500,000 (referred to as small-metro 
counties), and 435 remaining counties (referred to as large metro counties) using the June 
1999 delineation5 (Partridge et al., 2008; Partridge et al., 2009).  We first include total 
productivity growth and a lagged total productivity level as explanatory variables and then 
replace them with more disaggregated-sectoral productivity measures to explore potential 
differences in the effects of productivity in different parts of local economies. 
Control variables. The vector of variables that account for county economic 
conditions consists of three measures. First, we need to control for demand shocks to 
separate the effects of productivity growth from the effects that demand shocks would have 
on the local economy – i.e., we ask does productivity growth have additional effects 
beyond the effects of basic demand shocks? The industry mix term is the predicted growth 
rate of a county’s employment if all of its industries grow at their corresponding national 
rates. The industry mix variable is exogenous because it is based on national growth rates 
and lagged local industry employment shares. The industry mix term is also referred to as 
the Bartik (1991) instrument and is widely used in regional and urban research (Betz and 
Partridge, 2013; Partridge and Rickman, 1999; Tsvetkova and Partridge, 2016; Tsvetkova 
et al., 2017). The variable is calculated as follows: uv+Swx	CE = ∑ GC9EHI%y9EHI,E9        (12) 
where GC9EHI stands for the share of industry i in county c in period t-1 and %y9EHI,E  is the 
national growth rate of industry i between years t-1 and t. A first-difference of the industry 
mix variable is included in the model. The variable is calculated using employment data at 
the four-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code using the 
																																																								5	The	three	samples	are	referred	to	as	S1,	S2	and	S3,	respectively,	in	the	tables	of	results	below.	
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“unsuppressed” CBP data from the Upjohn Institute.  
The coefficient on the industry mix term can be interpreted as the average multiplier 
across all industries—i.e., if one job is created exogenously, the coefficient shows how 
many jobs are created on net after all spillovers including input-output links are accounted 
for. In our models that include the industry mix term, the estimated coefficients on the 
productivity variables specify their productivity effects after accounting for the local 
growth effects of having a mix of fast or slow growing industries. It is important to control 
for the demand conditions (by the industry mix term in our case) because they can be 
correlated with productivity growth and, if the industry mix term is omitted, our estimates 
could suffer from an omitted variable bias.  
In addition to the industry mix term, the effects of industrial composition are 
accounted for by the inclusion of the share of high-tech employment in a county in year 
2000 and the labor-intensive manufacturing share in 1990. These variables are important 
predictors of economic fortunes of a location with the former related to high-paying jobs, 
while the latter captures the effects of local exposure to low-cost international competition, 
primarily from China. The variables should account for any correlation between import 
competition and productivity growth—e.g., fierce foreign competition may spur domestic 
productivity growth, potentially leading to a spurious correlation between productivity 
growth and industry conditions. Lagging these variables also mitigates any endogeneity. 
Appendix Table A2 lists the NAICS codes for the low-wage manufacturing sector.  
In order to separate productivity effects on county performance from the net-
productivity effects of (or access to) agglomeration, we include the 1990 population size, 
land area, and distance to larger urban centers, which constitute the geography vector in our 
models. For counties outside of metropolitan areas, each model includes a measure of 
county population. For metro counties, the models include the county own population and 
population of its metropolitan area. All population counts are in logs. The U.S. Census 
Bureau is the data source for this variable. 
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The effects of urban hierarchy and access to urban services are captured by 
variables that measure distance to the nearest metro area for rural counties and a distance to 
the center of urban core for metro counties supplemented with measures of incremental 
distance to the nearest MSA with population of at least 250,000; incremental distance to the 
nearest MSA with population of at least 500,000 and to the nearest MSA with population 
of at least 1.5 million measured in 1990 (see Partridge et al., 2008 for a discussion of these 
variables). The final geography variable is land area to account for density effects. The 
variables are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau data and calculated (when necessary) 
using the ArcGIS software. 
Average educational attainment influences socioeconomic outcomes including 
productivity levels. In addition, industry productivity growth could be strongly correlated 
with concentrations of highly educated people, especially in high-tech industries. Thus, we 
include three educational controls, percent of adults with high school diploma only, percent 
of adults with Bachelor’s degree, and percent of adults with graduate or professional 
degree. The effects of racial and ethnic composition are captured by the shares of African-
American, American Native, Asian and other races, as well as the percent of residents of 
Hispanic origin. The data for these variables are from the 1990 U.S. Decennial Census to 
mitigate any endogeneity effects. 
Lastly, the amenity vector consists of the U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic 
Research Service (USDA ERS) natural amenity scale (with category one being the 
reference group) and three indicators for being within 50 miles to the Great Lakes, the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. In addition to these variables, each model includes a 
set of state dummies to factor out state-invariant characteristics, such as tax and regulatory 
environment and year fixed effects to account for common national trends that affect all 
counties similarly. Appendix Table B1 reports summary statistics for the dependent and 
main independent variables. 
In interpreting the time-invariant level variables (e.g., lagged productivity level), an 
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insignificant coefficient does not mean that the variable is economically unimportant 
because the variable may have persistent effects captured in the county fixed effect. With 
the county fixed effects (first) differenced out, these coefficients reflect any additional 
"disequilibrium" effects that these variables have on economic growth after their cross-
sectional long-term effects are differenced out in the county fixed effect.  
IV. Estimation results and discussion 
Base Employment Results. Each table in this section reports estimates for a set of 
dependent variables with results for all subsamples reported next to each other for easy 
comparison. Table 1 shows results for the base model that includes total productivity 
growth and initial total productivity level, followed by the models that split productivity 
measures by sector. The models include a full set of controls and dummy/fixed effects 
variables, but for brevity the tables show estimation coefficients for the productivity 
variables and the industry mix term only. Appendix Table C1 shows all estimation results 
for models reported in Table 1.6		
The upper panel of Table 1 reveals a negative impact of productivity level and 
(generally) no impact of productivity growth on total employment growth, as well as on job 
growth in the goods sector. The effects are generally insignificant in the service sectors 
except in large cities.  
A more detailed analysis reported in the lower panel shows a nuanced picture. First, 
productivity growth in the computer and electronic product manufacturing (NAICS334) 
industry (Comp) is associated with decreased total and goods sector job growth in both 
metro samples, but not in the rural samples, which could be due to a different composition 
of computer manufacturing in rural areas. Other productivity growth variables are 
insignificant except for the negative effects of productivity growth in services on goods 
employment growth in large MSA counties. Counties with higher productivity levels tend 
																																																								
6 Full estimation results are available upon request. 
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to have lower job growth. In particular, the NAICS334 productivity level is negatively 
related to services employment growth, but positively related to goods employment 
growth—suggesting that any negative net employment effects tend to be more concentrated 
in computer and electronic manufacturing. This result is noteworthy because the 
NAICS334 sector accounts for a vast share of measured productivity growth in the 
economy (Houseman et al., 2015). 
Service productivity levels appear to decrease total and goods employment growth 
in all samples. Goods productivity level (excluding computer and electronic product 
manufacturing) has a negative relation with total and service-sector employment in metro 
samples. Hence, high productivity levels in the goods or services sectors is associated with 
depressed employment in the other sector, indicating that any employment gains in one 
sector crowds out employment in the other sector (probably to reestablish spatial 
equilibrium). Overall, our analysis shows that local effects of productivity (both growth 
and level) have generally negative or zero effects on total employment and employment by 
major sector. The only positive coefficient on the lagged productivity level in nonmetro 
models for service employment disappears in the sectoral analysis in the lower panel.  
Table 1. OLS estimation results for first-differenced employment growth (%), 
total and for goods and services separately 
  Total employment  Goods employment  Services employment 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
Base model 
DProductivity growth  
-.031 -.022 -.1 -.058 -.22* -.16 .046 .084 -.1* 
(-1.23) (-0.36) (-1.51) (-0.48) (-1.96) (-1.65) (1.05) (1.43) (-1.71) 
Productivity level (lag)  
-2.7*** -3.4** -3.4** -33** -12*** -9.6*** 1.7*** -.094 -.37 
(-3.56) (-2.37) (-2.14) (-2.17) (-3.98) (-3.78) (2.65) (-0.08) (-0.29) 
DIndustry mix  
.48*** 1.2*** 1.2*** 1.3** 2.4*** 1.8*** .12 .78*** .7*** 
(4.28) (4.92) (6.02) (2.30) (3.98) (5.00) (1.01) (2.79) (3.41) 
Productivity variables for NAICS334, goods (no NAICS334) and services separately 
DComp productivity 
growth 
3.6e-03 -.52** -.38*** -.2 -1.5*** -.84*** .29 .11 -.25 
(0.06) (-2.61) (-3.57) (-0.69) (-2.97) (-2.93) (1.61) (1.10) (-1.61) 
DGoods productivity 
growth (no comp) 
-.038 5.9e-03 -.044 -.091 -.13 .014 .038 .069 -.09 
(-1.43) (0.09) (-0.51) (-0.88) (-1.37) (0.13) (0.91) (1.02) (-1.09) 
DServices productivity 
growth 
.049 .066 -.16 .81 .058 -.33** -.07 .11 -.12 
(0.51) (0.60) (-1.57) (1.41) (0.42) (-2.06) (-0.71) (0.85) (-1.12) 
Comp productivity level  
-.76 2.6 -1.2 -7.8 21 8.8** -2.9** -4.7*** -3.2** 
(-0.64) (0.67) (-0.58) (-0.61) (1.48) (2.51) (-2.37) (-3.12) (-2.17) 
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Goods productivity level 
(no comp) 
-.036 -4.6** -4.9** -2.5 1.9 4 -3.9*** -7.4*** -7.3*** 
(-0.04) (-2.01) (-2.04) (-0.16) (0.53) (1.64) (-3.70) (-3.00) (-3.39) 
Services productivity 
level 
-2** -4.2** -4** -24 -10*** -6.3*** .24 -2.1 -2.5 
(-2.50) (-2.49) (-2.17) (-1.61) (-3.46) (-2.76) (0.31) (-1.39) (-1.53) 
DIndustry mix  
.47*** 1.2*** 1.1*** 1.1** 2.2*** 1.8*** .15 .81*** .7*** 
(4.21) (4.74) (5.99) (2.04) (3.82) (4.92) (1.19) (2.87) (3.50) 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for 
S2 and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,237 for S1, 382 for 
S2 and 435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with population under 
500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau population data are used 
for grouping counties into samples. In addition to the control variables reported in Table C1, all models 
include state and year fixed effects, USDA amenity levels and location within 50 kms from Great Lakes, 
Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific Ocean. See the text for further details. 
In line with the literature, we also estimate the effects of productivity growth and 
productivity level on the unemployment rate (not shown for brevity). The results suggest 
that productivity growth decreases unemployment growth, while lagged productivity levels 
are associated with higher unemployment growth, in which especially the latter effect is 
consistent with the employment results. The detailed productivity analysis by sector 
suggests that the unemployment reducing effects of productivity growth stems entirely 
from the goods sector (excluding NAICS334), while productivity levels in all sectors have 
positive and statistically significant effects on unemployment growth. 
We tried some alternative specifications to assess the robustness of these results 
(not shown due to brevity). First, we omitted the industry mix (Bartik) demand shifter to 
assess whether including the local-based demand shock measure is affecting our 
productivity results, finding that the conclusions are essentially unchanged. Second, we 
omitted the other control variables except for the state fixed effects, finding that the main 
patterns were not greatly affected, giving us further confidence that the results are robust. 
High-tech/Low-tech Employment Results. We now further refine our analysis by 
examining the productivity effects on job growth in high-tech and low-tech industries 
separately. The estimation results for the “detailed” models are presented in Table 2. In line 
with our expectations, the NAICS334 computer productivity growth suppresses job growth 
mostly in high-tech industries (there is also a significant negative effect on low-tech job 
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growth in large metro counties). Again illustrating substitution across industries, 
productivity level in computer and electronic manufacturing is positively related to high-
tech job growth but has a suppressing effect on low-tech employment in the nonmetro and 
small metro samples, illustrating that at the local level, what may be good for one sector 
can often displace employment in other sectors.  
Increased goods- (excluding NAICS334) and service-productivity levels are also 
associated with less high-tech job growth, further suggesting workers do move to higher 
productivity-level industries, while migration could change the skilled composition. It 
appears that large-metro high-tech employment is negatively affected by all productivity-
growth and productivity-level measures (with the exception of NAICS334). Low-tech job 
growth in nonmetro counties is positively related to productivity growth in NAICS334, 
which may link to higher local wages and local demand. (Table 3 will show a positive link 
between productivity growth in the NAICS334 industry and average wage growth in 
nonmetro counties). Likewise, goods productivity level (excluding NAICS334) is 
positively related to low-tech job growth in nonmetro counties, while greater computer 
productivity level is negatively related to this outcome in the S1 and S2 subsamples. 
Overall in terms of statistical significance, high-tech employment is more affected by the 
productivity measures. 
 
Table 2. OLS estimation results for first-differenced employment growth (mid-point 
formula), high-tech and low-tech 
   High-tech employment Low-tech employment 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity 
growth 
-1.3** -2.4** -.76* .35*** .058 -.29* 
(-2.60) (-2.59) (-1.86) (3.28) (0.56) (-1.96) 
DGoods productivity 
growth (no comp) 
-.085 -.034 -.57** -.027 .018 .019 
(-0.57) (-0.27) (-2.27) (-0.87) (0.25) (0.26) 
DServices productivity 
growth 
.36 .28 -.51** .061 .025 -.079 
(1.27) (0.97) (-2.24) (0.91) (0.26) (-0.72) 
Comp productivity 
level 
30*** 31* 19** -3.9*** -2.7** -2.4 
(3.40) (1.78) (2.51) (-3.31) (-2.02) (-1.52) 
Goods productivity 
level (no comp) 
-14*** -22*** -19*** 2.4*** -.77 -.91 
(-6.82) (-2.97) (-3.26) (3.67) (-0.39) (-0.47) 
-10*** -17*** -13** -.087 -1.4 -.77 
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Services productivity 
level (-6.31) (-2.77) (-2.08) (-0.15) (-0.95) (-0.48) 
DIndustry mix  
2.4e-03 .43 1* .53*** 1.1*** 1*** 
(0.01) (0.51) (1.88) (5.42) (4.68) (5.28) 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for 
S2 and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; # of observations is 2,237 for S1, 382 for S2 and 
435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 
population under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau 
population data are used for grouping counties into samples. See Table 1’s notes for a list of other control 
variables. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for further details. 
Wages and Income. Table 3 presents results for annual growth in personal per-
capita income, in average wage per job, and median-household income. In contrast to the 
employment results, where the statistically significant productivity measures tend to have 
mostly negative effects, productivity growth generally is associated with enhanced per-
capita personal income and average wage per job growth rates, while productivity levels 
are negatively associated with income and earnings growth. One cause could be 
productivity growth is associated with upskilling but high productivity levels could be 
associated with substitution towards capital (in the cumulative sense). In particular, 
productivity growth in both goods (without NAICS334) and services has a strong positive 
effect on PCPI and AWPJ regardless of the sample (with the exception of small cities 
sample in the PCPI equations, where goods productivity growth is insignificant).  
Productivity growth in NAICS334 is positively related to average wage per job 
growth in nonmetro counties, whereas computer manufacturing productivity level has the 
same effects on PCPI and AWPJ growth in small-metro counties. Yet, the computer 
manufacturing productivity results suggest that the sector is associated with less 
employment and little offsetting gains in incomes. These results imply that a high-tech 
strategy related to this industry should be very cautiously undertaken at the local level. 
On the other hand, nonmetro and small metro counties that are more productive in 
producing goods other than computer and electronic products lag in PCPI growth, in AWPJ 
growth (in all metro counties) and in median household income growth in nonmetro 
counties. Counties enjoying a greater productivity level in services experience lower 
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growth in per-capita personal income and in average wage per job (in all samples) and in 
median household income. In terms of statistical significance, median household income is 
less affected than the income and wage growth measures, which could mean that 
productivity’s local income effects are more concentrated at the tails of the distribution.7 
Table 3. OLS estimation results for first-differenced earnings and income growth 
(%) variables  
  PCPI  AWPJ  Median HH income 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity 
growth 
-.03 -.026 .14 .056*** .073 .25 -.049* .043 .066 
(-0.70) (-0.29) (0.80) (3.41) (1.30) (1.45) (-1.75) (0.98) (1.11) 
DGoods productivity 
growth (no comp) 
.091*** .031 .063* .053*** .066*** .096*** -.011 .028 9.6e-03 
(4.14) (1.43) (1.79) (5.84) (2.78) (3.52) (-0.89) (0.77) (0.17) 
DServices productivity 
growth 
.42*** .24*** .5*** .14*** .12*** .26*** -.021 .022 .13* 
(3.30) (4.20) (4.22) (4.01) (2.74) (4.51) (-0.51) (0.36) (1.88) 
Comp productivity 
level 
-.65 1.4*** -.67 -.26 1.2*** 1.1 -.26 -.048 -.19 
(-1.50) (2.84) (-0.79) (-0.70) (3.04) (0.91) (-1.02) (-0.08) (-0.30) 
Goods productivity 
level (no comp) 
-.34** -.87** -1.6 -.19 -.9** -.84** -.26* -.49 -.47 
(-2.16) (-2.24) (-1.48) (-1.43) (-2.12) (-2.29) (-1.96) (-1.01) (-1.02) 
Services productivity 
level 
-.66*** -1.2*** -1.9 -.47*** -1*** -.84** -.19** -.45 -.63* 
(-4.59) (-3.82) (-1.51) (-4.11) (-3.43) (-2.17) (-2.19) (-1.25) (-1.94) 
DIndustry mix  
-.12** -.062 -.081 .021 -2.1e-03 -.032 .096*** .11 .12 
(-1.99) (-0.77) (-1.23) (0.93) (-0.03) (-0.54) (3.16) (0.93) (1.33) 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for 
S2 and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,237 for S1, 382 for 
S2 and 435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 
population under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau 
population data are used for grouping counties into samples. See Table 1’s notes for a list of other control 
variables. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for further details. 
V. Sensitivity analysis 
We now conduct a series of sensitivity analyses by first estimating the base models 
using instrumental variables (IV) because of the possibility of both reverse causality and 
omitted variables related to the explanatory variables in our models that might introduce a 
bias into the estimates (to be sure, HM use a similar variable as an exogenous instrument). 
Just as important, given that we use a proxy for productivity growth calculated, in part, 
from state-level data, the use of an IV approach should mitigate problems of potential 																																																								7While	the	main	purpose	of	our	study	is	not	to	assess	inequality,	using	the	county’s	Gini	coefficient,	we	found	relatively	little	statistical	link	between	productivity	and	inequality,	somewhat	consistent	with	HM’s	findings	due	to	offsetting	effects	at	the	top	and	bottom	of	the	distribution.	
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measurement error.  
Following Partridge et al. (2017), we utilize a novel way to construct two 
instruments for the productivity variables. Using the STATA psmatch2 procedure (Leuven 
& Sianesi, 2003), we identify the first and the second matches for each county determined 
by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance on a series of observable characteristics that 
include the industry mix variable, shares of routine (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2015), and 
high-tech employment (Fallah, Partridge and Rickman, 2014), as well as employment in 
manufacturing and agriculture, log of population, share of adults with graduate degree, 
distance to the nearest MSA, 1998 productivity level (the earliest year for which the 
detailed industry-level employment data are available) and productivity growth for 1998-
2001; for metropolitan areas we also use the log of metropolitan area population. These 
characteristics are generally key observable features associated with local productivity 
structures. All characteristics for matching are measured in year 2000 (except for 
productivity growth for 1998-2001 and the industry mix term for which we use the average 
value over the study period).  
Counties were exactly matched on their metro/nonmetro status. All matches lie at 
least 125 miles away from the county being matched to ensure that spillovers are 
inconsequential and to limit any correlation of omitted variables due to spatial proximity. 
Additionally, every matching county is selected from a different state than the county being 
matched to avoid the confounding influence of common factors, such as tax regime, 
business climate, or culture. After we identify two matching counties for every county, we 
calculate productivity measures (growth rates and levels) using employment data for the 
matching counties and value added data for the state of the county being matched (the 
BEA value-added data at the industry/sector level are available by state) to derive value-
added per worker and employment shares used in calculating county-level productivity. We 
then use productivity measures of the matching counties as the instruments for productivity 
measures of the counties being matched. The advantage of having two instruments is that 
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we can conduct an overidentification test in addition to conventional tests for instrument 
strength and the presence of endogeneity. Tables 4 and 5 and show the IV results. 
Before we describe the IV estimation results, it is important to note that possible 
endogeneity (or measurement error) is detected in 11 of the 18 models in Tables 4 and 5 as 
suggested by the Durbin P-value at the 5% level of significance. The endogeneity is more 
likely to be a problem in the employment equations compared to the income and earnings 
models. While some instruments are weak (mostly those measuring productivity in 
NAICS334 industry, plausibly due to relatively few counties having its presence), all 
models are identified.  
Table 4. IV estimation results for first-differenced employment growth (%), total and for 
goods and services separately 
  Total employment  Goods employment  Services employment 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity 
growth (v1) 
0.166 -0.263** -0.142 1.483* -0.765** -1.146*** 0.376*** 0.055 0.028 
(0.133) (0.130) (0.188) (0.852) (0.299) (0.384) (0.140) (0.119) (0.210) 
DGoods productivity 
growth (no comp) (v2) 
0.019 -0.009 -0.143 -0.099 -0.276 -0.191 0.110 0.309 -0.101 
(0.071) (0.166) (0.107) (0.747) (0.198) (0.187) (0.077) (0.215) (0.126) 
DServices productivity 
growth (v3) 
0.028 0.050 -0.160* -0.944 0.009 -0.353*** 0.011 0.079 -0.072 
(0.066) (0.070) (0.083) (0.787) (0.126) (0.133) (0.071) (0.077) (0.097) 
Comp productivity level 
v(4) 
0.075 -1.546 2.915 5.604 0.133 0.545 -1.274 -2.663 2.892 
(4.827) (4.603) (7.307) (24.427) (8.265) (14.686) (5.458) (5.186) (7.750) 
Goods productivity level 
(no comp) v(5) 
0.148 -2.893 -3.893 -8.218 -7.763 -4.120 0.478 -1.212 -2.974 
(1.694) (7.871) (7.645) (26.355) (9.969) (13.146) (1.874) (13.259) (8.654) 
Services productivity 
level v(6) 
-0.433 -2.459 -1.859 -8.227 -7.211 -2.674 0.050 -0.779 -1.446 
(1.286) (6.390) (4.676) (23.713) (7.393) (9.018) (1.387) (11.064) (5.244) 
DIndustry mix  
0.466*** 1.219*** 1.171*** 1.202** 2.364*** 1.826*** 0.127 0.760*** 0.713*** 
(0.153) (0.203) (0.173) (0.528) (0.512) (0.264) (0.147) (0.224) (0.206) 
1st stage F-stat v(1) 2.184 16.97 7.167 2.024 16.94 7.308 2.184 16.97 7.167 
1st stage F-stat v(2) 5.723 5.657 22.39 9.913 5.086 18.11 5.723 5.657 22.39 
1st stage F-stat v(3) 368.3 265.3 294.1 373.9 249.4 290.2 368.3 265.3 294.1 
1st stage F-stat v(4) 4.635 4.397 6.730 3.014 3.871 6.259 4.635 4.397 6.730 
1st stage F-stat v(5) 121.8 31.69 18.40 100.7 28.59 17.53 121.8 31.69 18.40 
1st stage F-stat v(6) 121.7 26.85 28.23 103.7 23.95 28.77 121.7 26.85 28.23 
Endogeneity test p-val 0.000 0.503 0.623 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Over-ID test p-val 0.334 0.290 0.725 0.387 0.389 0.854 0.070 0.402 0.866 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for 
S2 and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,237 for S1, 382 for 
S2 and 435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 
population under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau 
population data are used for grouping counties into samples. See Table 1’s notes for a list of other control 
variables. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for further details. 
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Table 4’s results continue to generally support the weak negative link between 
computer productivity growth and job growth (3 of the 5 significant coefficients are 
negative), but most of the other employment-productivity results are insignificant. The two 
cases where the NAICS334 productivity growth term is positive are for nonmetro goods 
and services employment—while corresponding OLS results are insignificant. Thus, we 
should caution that our previous negative findings from OLS estimation may be overstated, 
but the positive effects only apply in rural goods (without NAICS334) and services 
employment, meaning only a small part of the economy may have a positive productivity 
growth-employment growth relationship, with the general pattern being that greater local 
productivity growth is not associated with faster job growth.  
Results in Table 5 generally show a positive relation between productivity growth 
and per-capita personal income and average wage growth, supporting the OLS results. A 
notable difference is that productivity growth in the NAICS334 industry considerably 
boosts AWPJ growth in all county types (it was mostly insignificant in the OLS results), 
while a significant effect of productivity level variables disappears in the models that 
exhibit evidence of endogeneity. Also there is a general lack of significance for all 
productivity measures in the median household income models, supporting the OLS results.  
Table 5. IV estimation results for first-differenced earnings and income growth (%) 
variables 
  PCPI  AWPJ  Median HH income 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity 
growth (v1) 
0.025 0.204** 0.212 0.135** 0.232** 0.457*** -0.061 -0.047 -0.072 
(0.070) (0.104) (0.179) (0.065) (0.110) (0.170) (0.038) (0.074) (0.139) 
DGoods productivity 
growth (no comp) (v2) 
0.241*** 0.148** 0.067 0.069*** 0.087** 0.052 0.034 0.006 -0.094 
(0.034) (0.071) (0.055) (0.023) (0.043) (0.050) (0.033) (0.077) (0.081) 
DServices productivity 
growth (v3) 
0.508*** 0.295*** 0.555*** 0.199*** 0.185*** 0.345*** 0.002 0.004 0.127* 
(0.053) (0.045) (0.082) (0.026) (0.037) (0.049) (0.032) (0.053) (0.065) 
Comp productivity level 
v(4) 
-1.732 1.037 2.033 -0.352 0.429 3.372 0.293 -1.469 1.877 
(3.448) (2.328) (4.904) (1.802) (1.924) (4.021) (1.839) (2.488) (4.154) 
Goods productivity level 
(no comp) v(5) 
-1.043 -1.882 -1.972 -0.099 -1.994 -1.548 -0.356 -1.161 -1.479 
(0.940) (1.872) (3.830) (0.499) (1.785) (3.150) (0.664) (2.519) (3.873) 
Services productivity 
level v(6) 
-1.087 -1.602 -1.571 -0.229 -1.738 -0.766 -0.213 -1.141 -1.205 
(0.691) (1.458) (2.351) (0.381) (1.338) (1.980) (0.514) (1.949) (2.523) 
-0.120*** -0.057 -0.070 0.018 0.008 -0.031 0.088*** 0.103 0.122* 
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DIndustry mix  (0.042) (0.096) (0.070) (0.019) (0.047) (0.058) (0.025) (0.078) (0.070) 
1st stage F-stat v(1) 2.184 16.97 7.167 2.184 16.97 7.167 2.184 16.97 7.167 
1st stage F-stat v(2) 5.723 5.657 22.39 5.723 5.657 22.39 5.723 5.657 22.39 
1st stage F-stat v(3) 368.3 265.3 294.1 368.3 265.3 294.1 368.3 265.3 294.1 
1st stage F-stat v(4) 4.635 4.397 6.730 4.635 4.397 6.730 4.635 4.397 6.730 
1st stage F-stat v(5) 121.8 31.69 18.40 121.8 31.69 18.40 121.8 31.69 18.40 
1st stage F-stat v(6) 121.7 26.85 28.23 121.7 26.85 28.23 121.7 26.85 28.23 
Endogeneity test p-val 0.094 0.012 0.373 0.004 0.004 0.021 0.790 0.348 0.643 
Over-ID test p-val 0.692 0.993 0.818 0.470 0.816 0.563 0.901 0.298 0.900 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for 
S2 and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,237 for S1, 382 for 
S2 and 435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 
population under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau 
population data are used for grouping counties into samples. See Table 1’s notes for a list of other control 
variables. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for further details. 
In the next step we conduct a series of analyses to probe into the mechanisms of the 
productivity/outcome linkages. Beaudry et al. (2010) argue that information and 
communication technology (ICT) is more quickly adopted in areas with better educated 
populations, whereas Autor and Dorn (2013) find that ICT is linked to greater declines in 
routine tasks. Thus, we assess whether interaction between productivity and share of 
university graduates increases job losses because the productivity adoption accelerates the 
loss of low-skilled workers. We then repeat the analysis using the share of routine-task 
employment instead of the share of university graduates in the interaction models. The 
results are reported in Appendix Tables D1 and D2 for total employment growth and 
average wage per job growth, respectively. Overall, there seems to be very few statistically 
significant interactions, especially with education. In the total job growth models, only one 
interaction term (goods productivity growth excluding NAICS334 interacted with the share 
of adults with BA degree or higher in the S3 sample) attains statistical significance at the 
5% level. While the interaction is negative, the main effects are insignificant. This 
complicates interpretation, but it does weakly suggest that productivity growth associated 
with more educated workers displaces lower-skilled workers.  
In the AWPJ models, the negative relationship to NAICS334 productivity level is 
mitigated by a greater share of college graduates. As follows from Table D2, the share of 
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routine employment in a county is more likely to be an intervening factor in the 
relationship between productivity measures and average wage growth than for job growth. 
In the nonmetro sample, counties with greater routine employment enjoy smaller 
stimulating effects of NAICS334 productivity growth, suggesting that the growth in 
computer manufacturing productivity is displacing routine workers. However, a greater 
share of routine workers is associated with a more simulative (less negative) wage effect 
from service productivity growth. Lastly, in large MSA counties, the negative effect of 
goods productivity growth (excluding computer and electronic manufacturing) is alleviated 
by a greater share of routine employment, which is somewhat surprising given that these 
technologies are thought to displace routine workers. However, as noted above, these 
results should be taken with caution. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we test a common perception that productivity and productivity 
growth are universally beneficial to the local economies. From a theoretical perspective, 
the compensation and substitution effects of productivity growth are at work and should, on 
balance, determine the relationship between productivity and employment. There are 
several reasons to expect local labor markets to be differentially affected compared to the 
aggregate case. For instance, the productivity effects can be spatially distinct from the 
positive consumption effects that are derived from greater productivity or migration might 
play a role in offsetting differential shocks to help restore spatial equilibrium.  
We construct novel measures of county-level productivity that utilize state-level 
value added data by industry/sector and corresponding industry/sector employment shares 
by county. We separate productivity measures into those pertaining to the NAICS334 
computer and electronic product manufacturing industry, goods sector (excluding 
NAICS334) and services to discern varying effects within local economies and to account 
for the out-sized influence of computer manufacturing. The outcomes of interest are 
employment, earnings, and income growth variables, which we supplement with detailed 
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analyses of employment by sector. The analyses are performed separately for nonmetro 
counties, counties within small MSAs with populations under 500,000 in 1990 and in large 
MSA counties (all remaining counties) to explore the heterogeneity along the rural-urban 
continuum.  
OLS and IV results generally suggest that NAICS334 productivity growth is 
associated with decreased local job growth in metro counties (total and goods 
employment), though the IV results suggest a possible positive employment response in 
service industries of rural counties. Productivity growth is generally positively associated 
with per-capita personal income growth and average wage growth, though there are 
variations across model specifications and geographies.  
Focusing on the IV results, productivity growth in the computer manufacturing 
industry emerges as a consistent suppressing factor in the goods jobs growth in all metro 
samples and in total job growth in counties in small MSAs. While generally negatively 
related to job growth (with stronger effects detected in the high-tech sector), NAICS334 
productivity growth consistently stimulates average wage per job growth in all types of 
counties. One other feature of the results is that high-productivity growth in one sector can 
crowd out growth in other sectors (perhaps due to higher wages and attracting high-skilled 
workers).  
In sum, the relatively weak negative effects of productivity growth (except in 
computer and electronic products) are offset by positive productivity level effects, along 
with the general income-increasing effects of productivity growth. This suggests that a 
local development strategy of having a concentration of industries with high productivity 
growth (except for computer manufacturing) may be a good one (though HM caution that 
wage gains will also be capitalized into housing prices). This is especially true since such 
an industry composition is less likely to be insulated from larger negative shocks. Yet, we 
warn that one should not extrapolate and suggest these findings represent national effects, 
in which many authors are guilty of interpreting regional results that way. Namely, in our 
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empirical analysis, the time fixed effects capture common national trends that include 
productivity effects that could overwhelm our direct results. Finally, our findings in this 
paper are remarkably in line with those of HM. This is despite examining different periods, 
vastly different empirical specification, their use of MSAs and TFP compared to counties 
and average labor productivity. This adds confidence in both papers’ findings. 
Overall, productivity growth emerges as a positive driver of AWPJ and PCPI 
growth with a few exceptions, where only two productivity growth variables (out of three) 
are significant. Productivity level, on the other hand, is generally not statistically linked to 
earnings and income variables in our analysis. There is also practically no evidence of any 
effects of productivity on median household income. This fact, combined with the strong 
positive effects detected in the PCPI and AWPJ models, may indirectly point to the 
increasing income gap during the study period. An exploratory analysis of the intervening 
role potentially played by two factors highlighted in the literature on the effects of 
productivity and automation growth, namely educational attainment and the share of 
routine employment, produced mixed results. There seems to be some limited evidence of 
possible intervening impact of the routine employment share in the AWPJ models but the 
estimates are largely inconclusive.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1. List of high-technology industries 
NAICS code Industry 
1131 Timber Tract Operations 
1132 Forest Nurseries and Gathering of Forest Products 
2111 Oil and Gas Extraction 
3241 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 
3251 Basic Chemical Manufacturing 
3252 Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Artificial Synthetic Fibers and Filaments Manufacturing 
3253 Pesticide, Fertilizer, and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing 
3254 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing 
3255 Paint, Coating, and Adhesive Manufacturing 
3259 Other Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing 
3332 Industrial Machinery Manufacturing 
3333 Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing 
3336 Engine, Turbine, and Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing 
3339 Other General Purpose Machinery Manufacturing 
3341 Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing 
3343 Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing 
3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing 
3345 Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments Manufacturing 
3346 Manufacturing and Reproducing Magnetic and Optical Media 
3353 Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
3364 Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing 
3369 Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 
4234 Professional and Commercial Equipment and Supplies Merchant Wholesalers 
4861 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 
4862 Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas 
4869 Other Pipeline Transportation 
5112 Software Publishers 
5171 Wired Telecommunications Carriers 
5172 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) 
5174 Satellite Telecommunications 
5179 Other Telecommunications 
5182 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 
5191 Other Information Services 
5211 Monetary Authorities-Central Bank 
5232 Securities and Commodity Exchanges 
5413 Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services 
5415 Computer Systems Design and Related Services 
5416 Management, Scientific, and Technical Consulting Services 
5417 Scientific Research and Development Services 
5511 Management of Companies and Enterprises 
5612 Facilities Support Services 
8112 Electronic and Precision Equipment Repair and Maintenance 
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Table A2. List of labor-intensive manufacturing industries 
NAICS code Industry 
3131 Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills 
3132 Fabric Mill 
3133 Textile and Fabric Finishing and Fabric Coating Mills 
3141 Textile Furnishings Mills 
3149 Other Textile Product Mills 
3151 Apparel Knitting Mills 
3152 Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturin 
3159 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing 
3161 Leather and Hide Tanning and Finishing 
3162 Footwear Manufacturing 
3169 Other Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 
3371 Household and Institutional Furniture and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturing 
3372 Office Furniture (including Fixtures) Manufacturing 
3379 Other Furniture Related Product Manufacturing 
3399 Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Table B1. Summary statistics for main variables used in estimation by sample 
Variable 
Nonmetro (S1) Small metro (S2) Large metro (S3) 
Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max Mean St.Dev Min Max 
Dependent variables 
DTotal employment growth 0.01 15.62 -579.51 579.12 -0.02 8.11 -116.72 115.22 -0.05 7.27 -126.53 90.98 
DGoods employment growth 0.11 99.32 -10,532.94 10,387.92 0.07 16.67 -486.61 394.71 0.11 12.58 -203.21 218.33 
DServices employment growth -0.04 16.85 -728.19 729.73 -0.06 9.52 -228.93 225.77 -0.10 7.86 -121.17 112.20 
DHigh-tech employment growth -1.39 62.30 -400.00 400.00 -0.07 31.67 -270.84 233.33 -0.11 26.94 -234.51 294.23 
DLow-tech employment growth 0.02 13.09 -211.31 251.03 -0.02 7.49 -78.05 84.27 -0.05 6.90 -108.05 102.23 
DPer capita personal income growth -0.08 10.47 -160.66 191.77 0.00 4.96 -74.82 51.08 0.00 5.85 -174.64 186.48 
DAverage wage per job growth -0.08 4.95 -114.61 70.06 -0.05 3.02 -34.68 17.69 -0.07 3.57 -67.86 78.22 
DMedian household income growth 0.07 7.76 -63.67 61.50 0.14 6.90 -32.50 30.21 0.08 6.27 -28.49 38.43 
Independent variables 
DVA per worker growth -0.14 4.77 -85.04 98.99 -0.12 4.24 -45.31 62.14 -0.12 3.12 -23.22 31.75 
log VA per worker initial level (lagged) -2.82 0.20 -3.67 -0.94 -2.81 0.14 -3.23 -1.77 -2.76 0.15 -3.53 -1.97 
DNAICS334 VA per worker growth -0.01 0.94 -85.65 76.06 -0.02 0.92 -24.76 26.77 -0.02 0.70 -14.94 18.15 
DGoods (no NAICS334) VA per worker growth  -0.06 4.17 -77.75 97.72 -0.05 3.39 -43.22 59.85 -0.05 2.16 -24.34 28.59 
DServices VA per worker growth -0.07 1.86 -27.43 27.61 -0.05 1.95 -15.98 17.68 -0.05 1.76 -7.87 9.16 
log NAICS334 VA per worker initial level (lagged) -0.01 0.04 -1.88 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -1.64 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.50 0.01 
log Goods (no NAICS334) VA per worker initial 
level (lagged) -0.64 0.34 -2.45 0.00 -0.53 0.25 -1.86 -0.03 -0.49 0.23 -1.73 -0.04 
log Services VA per worker initial level (lagged) -2.17 0.43 -3.67 -0.17 -2.26 0.31 -3.10 -0.96 -2.25 0.26 -3.42 -1.10 
DIndustry mix 0.04 2.83 -106.36 108.59 0.01 2.52 -17.28 20.37 -0.01 2.52 -12.03 13.30 
High-tech employment share in 2000 5.32 6.16 0.00 66.98 8.13 5.32 0.31 33.72 10.20 6.85 0.06 46.39 
Low wage manufacturing share in 1990 3.94 6.20 0.04 44.15 2.52 4.56 0.10 38.69 2.52 4.13 0.07 28.83 
Log Population in 1990 9.60 0.96 6.12 12.07 11.39 0.88 8.55 13.09 11.87 1.29 8.58 16.00 
	 1	
Log MSA Population in 1990 (metro samples only) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.25 0.54 10.95 13.10 14.24 0.69 13.14 16.00 
% high school diploma only 35.07 5.91 13.54 52.56 32.66 6.29 15.60 49.09 32.34 6.12 14.77 49.42 
% BA degree 7.94 3.34 1.82 40.32 11.02 4.11 3.03 25.71 12.41 5.32 3.18 28.90 
% Professional and graduate degree 3.76 1.88 0.34 23.48 6.05 3.38 1.73 29.67 6.49 3.49 1.27 23.97 
% African-American 8.13 15.12 0.00 86.24 9.41 11.77 0.02 57.66 9.82 11.47 0.02 63.18 
% Native American 1.65 6.19 0.00 82.41 0.71 1.97 0.04 29.23 0.63 1.73 0.02 19.73 
% Asian 0.33 0.44 0.00 5.47 1.12 1.53 0.02 12.76 1.51 2.47 0.04 29.13 
% Other race 1.79 4.79 0.00 44.43 2.01 4.35 0.01 29.08 1.93 3.65 0.04 22.19 
% Non-Hispanic origin 95.59 11.66 2.78 100.00 95.19 10.93 6.13 99.85 95.38 8.18 30.42 99.87 
Distance to nearest MSA 90.31 58.73 0.00 408.19 12.45 14.78 0.00 110.34 29.83 19.94 0.00 145.83 
Incr distance to metro >250k 67.24 106.43 0.00 621.43 64.74 96.65 0.00 621.56 2.37 9.64 0.00 78.10 
Incr distance to metro>500k 43.16 67.37 0.00 490.15 71.23 78.73 0.00 490.54 1.62 7.15 0.00 60.96 
Incr distance to metro>1500k 90.79 114.44 0.00 597.11 76.36 108.16 0.00 530.77 96.48 143.24 0.00 599.21 
Note: Δ = change; WPJ = wage per job; HH = household 
Number of observations is 3,048 except for ln(MSApop) where the number is determined by corresponding MSA definition (1,054 during the 1990-2000 
period and 1,063 during the 2010-2013 period) 
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Appendix C 
Table C1. Full OLS estimation results for total employment growth variables 
  1990-2000  2000-2010  2010-2013 
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity 
growth 
3.6e-03 -.52** -.38*** -.2 -1.5*** -.84*** .29 .11 -.25 
(0.06) (-2.61) (-3.57) (-0.69) (-2.97) (-2.93) (1.61) (1.10) (-1.61) 
DGoods productivity 
growth (no comp) 
-.038 5.9e-03 -.044 -.091 -.13 .014 .038 .069 -.09 
(-1.43) (0.09) (-0.51) (-0.88) (-1.37) (0.13) (0.91) (1.02) (-1.09) 
DServices 
productivity growth 
.049 .066 -.16 .81 .058 -.33** -.07 .11 -.12 
(0.51) (0.60) (-1.57) (1.41) (0.42) (-2.06) (-0.71) (0.85) (-1.12) 
Comp productivity 
level 
-.76 2.6 -1.2 -7.8 21 8.8** -2.9** -4.7*** -3.2** 
(-0.64) (0.67) (-0.58) (-0.61) (1.48) (2.51) (-2.37) (-3.12) (-2.17) 
Goods productivity 
level (no comp) 
-.036 -4.6** -4.9** -2.5 1.9 4 -3.9*** -7.4*** -7.3*** 
(-0.04) (-2.01) (-2.04) (-0.16) (0.53) (1.64) (-3.70) (-3.00) (-3.39) 
Services productivity 
level 
-2** -4.2** -4** -24 -10*** -6.3*** .24 -2.1 -2.5 
(-2.50) (-2.49) (-2.17) (-1.61) (-3.46) (-2.76) (0.31) (-1.39) (-1.53) 
DIndustry mix  
.47*** 1.2*** 1.1*** 1.1** 2.2*** 1.8*** .15 .81*** .7*** 
(4.21) (4.74) (5.99) (2.04) (3.82) (4.92) (1.19) (2.87) (3.50) 
HT emp share, 2000  
.013* .053** .047*** .21** .14** .069** -.011 .021 .029 
(1.76) (2.33) (2.77) (1.98) (2.04) (2.06) (-1.55) (1.13) (1.52) 
Low-wage manuf 
share, 1990 
.027*** 4.3e-04 -.019 .25*** .25*** .22*** -.058*** -.1*** -.11*** 
(3.30) (0.02) (-1.21) (3.63) (4.22) (4.76) (-6.11) (-3.87) (-4.57) 
lnPop, 1990  
.025 .035 .051 -.35 -1.2*** -.65*** -.018 .4*** .23** 
(0.61) (0.44) (0.67) (-1.19) (-3.30) (-4.26) (-0.33) (2.92) (2.60) 
lnPop (MSA), 1990  
0 -7.1e-03 -.052 0 .8* .32** 0 -.33** -.15** 
(.) (-0.09) (-1.07) (.) (1.92) (2.22) (.) (-2.39) (-2.36) 
% HS only, 1990  
.017** 6.6e-03 -.019 .22*** .2** .036 -.028*** -.057** -.04** 
(2.36) (0.36) (-1.22) (2.77) (2.47) (0.65) (-2.91) (-2.51) (-2.04) 
% BA, 1990  
.019 8.9e-03 -3.8e-03 -.12 .017 -.021 .065*** .039 .012 
(1.17) (0.46) (-0.30) (-1.17) (0.19) (-0.45) (2.93) (1.48) (0.54) 
% grad&prof, 1990  
-.079*** -.023 -.045** -.82*** -.058 -.14** .06** -.034 -.014 
(-3.23) (-1.10) (-2.27) (-3.20) (-0.56) (-2.55) (2.21) (-1.27) (-0.52) 
% Black, 1990  
2.1e-03 9.3e-03* 7.1e-03** .013 .022 -6.0e-03 1.8e-03 8.7e-03 .01* 
(0.75) (1.77) (2.05) (0.55) (1.11) (-0.57) (0.47) (1.58) (1.97) 
% Native, 1990  
-.016*** .013 -.028 -.11** -.016 .11 .011* .036** -.076 
(-2.81) (1.40) (-1.14) (-2.24) (-0.38) (1.43) (1.79) (2.59) (-1.59) 
% Asian, 1990  
-.08 -.031 .026*** .75 -.073 5.0e-03 -.15* 6.9e-03 .045*** 
(-1.27) (-1.23) (2.77) (1.25) (-0.52) (0.12) (-1.79) (0.17) (3.22) 
% Other, 1990  
.022** .019 -.015 .16* .25*** .17** -.026** -.056** -.073** 
(2.19) (1.11) (-0.91) (1.90) (2.96) (2.30) (-2.03) (-2.14) (-2.57) 
% Non-hisp, 1990  
3.9e-03 4.9e-03 -.014* .072* .067** .051** -.02*** -.019* -.035*** 
(0.79) (0.86) (-1.82) (1.87) (2.06) (2.13) (-3.79) (-1.89) (-3.31) 
Near MSA, km  
-2.0e-03*** 1.1e-03 9.0e-04 -.021*** -.015 -9.5e-03 3.5e-03*** 5.8e-03 2.7e-03 
(-3.09) (0.54) (0.41) (-3.56) (-1.12) (-1.34) (4.65) (1.26) (0.81) 
IncrDist to  250k+  
3.9e-04 4.9e-05 6.7e-03* -2.3e-04 -4.8e-03* -9.8e-03 1.2e-03*** 1.8e-03** 9.1e-03* 
(0.79) (0.08) (1.84) (-0.06) (-1.67) (-1.01) (2.84) (2.38) (1.88) 
IncrDist to  500k+  
1.9e-04 -6.7e-04* 3.0e-03 5.8e-03 -2.8e-03 1.7e-03 -1.2e-04 5.7e-04 3.8e-03 
(0.48) (-1.67) (1.06) (1.56) (-1.33) (0.15) (-0.25) (0.80) (0.67) 
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IncrDist to 1.5m+  
-4.8e-04 -5.0e-04 -3.9e-04 1.4e-03 -3.8e-04 -1.5e-04 9.7e-05 -4.2e-04 -8.3e-04 
(-1.49) (-1.36) (-0.82) (0.46) (-0.19) (-0.10) (0.26) (-0.88) (-1.22) 
Constant  
-4.4* -14*** -10 -55 -31*** -14* -.45 -7.8 -5.8 
(-1.68) (-2.70) (-1.55) (-1.18) (-3.13) (-1.69) (-0.15) (-1.36) (-1.11) 
N 35,696 6,112 6,960 30,661 5,984 6,864 35,696 6,112 6,960 
R-sq 0.022 0.103 0.120 0.009 0.110 0.153 0.012 0.047 0.062 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for S2 
and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,238 for S1, 382 for S2 and 
435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 population 
under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau population data are used 
for grouping counties into samples. In addition to the control variables reported in Table C1, all models include 
fixed effects for USDA amenity levels, location within 50 kms from Great Lakes, Atlantic Ocean, and Pacific 
Ocean, as well as state and year fixed effects. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for 
further details. 
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Appendix D 
 
	
Table D1. OLS estimation results for total employment growth (interaction models) 
  
 
Interacting variable: % College 
Graduates  
Interacting variable: % Routine 
Employment  
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity growth  
-.32 -.97** -.52* .32 -2.8 1.1 
(-1.52) (-2.22) (-1.73) (0.47) (-1.20) (0.69) 
DGoods productivity growth (no 
comp) 
-.036 .29 .3 -.07 .14 -.74 
(-0.52) (1.25) (1.43) (-0.37) (0.34) (-1.34) 
DServices productivity growth  
.29** .26 -.18 .45 -1.5** .82 
(2.05) (0.90) (-0.76) (0.67) (-2.04) (1.10) 
Comp productivity level  
1.8 12 -.97 -4.6 57* -7.7 
(0.76) (1.46) (-0.23) (-0.74) (1.71) (-0.35) 
Goods productivity level (no comp)  
.79 -4.8 -3.5 6.6 -7.6 -3.1 
(0.65) (-0.98) (-1.26) (1.46) (-0.45) (-0.63) 
Services productivity level  
-1.5 -3.4 -3.2 1 -2.3 .34 
(-1.48) (-0.92) (-1.23) (0.30) (-0.18) (0.07) 
Interacting variable  
-.16 -.15 -.14 -35 -10 -23 
(-0.46) (-0.26) (-0.67) (-0.96) (-0.10) (-0.65) 
DComp productivity growth X 
Interacting variable 
.025* .023 7.4e-03 -1 6.7 -4.8 
(1.88) (1.51) (0.60) (-0.57) (1.00) (-1.03) 
DGoods productivity growth (no 
comp) X Interacting variable 
-3.6e-04 -.022 -.026** .11 -.4 1.9 
(-0.05) (-1.47) (-2.19) (0.22) (-0.37) (1.27) 
DServices productivity growth X 
Interacting variable 
-.019* -.011 1.2e-03 -1.4 4.7** -3 
(-1.66) (-0.78) (0.16) (-0.59) (2.10) (-1.40) 
Comp productivity level X Interacting 
variable 
-.24 -.5* 2.1e-03 14 -162* 23 
(-1.10) (-1.74) (0.02) (0.69) (-1.77) (0.38) 
Goods productivity level (no comp) X 
Interacting variable 
-.078 .015 -.082 -22 6.6 -2.7 
(-0.50) (0.06) (-1.19) (-1.34) (0.15) (-0.21) 
Services productivity level X 
Interacting variable 
-.042 -.058 -.036 -12 -8.2 -12 
(-0.39) (-0.27) (-0.48) (-1.00) (-0.24) (-0.90) 
DIndustry mix  
.47*** 1.2*** 1.1*** .45*** 1.2*** 1.1*** 
(4.21) (4.78) (6.01) (3.89) (4.47) (5.70) 
** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for S2 
and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,238 for S1, 382 for S2 and 
435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 population 
under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau population data are used 
for grouping counties into samples. In addition to the control variables reported in Table C1, all models also include 
fixed effects for states, USDA amenity levels and location within 50 kms from Great Lakes, Atlantic Ocean, and 
Pacific Ocean. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for further details. 
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Table D2. OLS estimation results for average wage per job growth (interaction models) 
  
 
Interacting variable: % College 
Graduates  
Interacting variable: % Routine 
Employment  
 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 
DComp productivity growth  
-.026 -.057 -.82 .31*** -.78 2.4 
(-0.32) (-0.30) (-1.56) (2.83) (-1.16) (1.66) 
DGoods productivity growth (no 
comp) 
.029 .087 .028 .033 .068 -.7*** 
(1.16) (1.59) (0.41) (0.74) (0.55) (-3.26) 
DServices productivity growth  
.15** .076 .38*** -.29*** -.17 .18 
(2.40) (0.84) (2.83) (-2.71) (-0.90) (0.47) 
Comp productivity level  
-.95* .76 -3.7** -2.2 12* 3.2 
(-1.68) (0.86) (-2.21) (-1.38) (1.97) (0.21) 
Goods productivity level (no comp)  
-.1 -1.3* -1.3*** .34 3.4 -1 
(-0.43) (-1.93) (-2.68) (0.73) (1.54) (-0.49) 
Services productivity level  
-.28 -1.2** -1.2* -.38 2.9* -1.8 
(-1.35) (-2.44) (-1.93) (-0.81) (1.79) (-0.80) 
Interacting variable 
(college grad% or routine%) 
-.049 .031 .051 -1.5 -30** 4.9 
(-1.05) (0.57) (1.04) (-0.40) (-2.14) (0.27) 
DComp productivity growth X 
Interacting variable 
6.4e-03 6.4e-03 .048 -.69** 2.6 -6.1 
(1.12) (0.63) (1.62) (-2.13) (1.23) (-1.52) 
DGoods productivity growth (no 
comp) X Interacting variable 
2.4e-03 -1.6e-03 5.1e-03 .039 -.016 2.3*** 
(1.07) (-0.40) (1.12) (0.36) (-0.05) (3.67) 
DServices productivity growth X 
Interacting variable 
-1.2e-03 2.2e-03 -6.3e-03 1.5*** .82 .18 
(-0.29) (0.53) (-1.37) (4.05) (1.47) (0.17) 
Comp productivity level X Interacting 
variable 
.063 .024 .2** 5.8 -33* -2.3 
(1.24) (0.69) (2.19) (0.96) (-1.86) (-0.05) 
Goods productivity level (no comp) X 
Interacting variable 
-5.6e-03 .027 .027* -2.2 -12* -1.3 
(-0.31) (1.16) (1.85) (-1.57) (-1.92) (-0.21) 
Services productivity level X 
Interacting variable 
-.017 8.8e-03 .018 -.16 -11** 1.5 
(-1.04) (0.46) (0.92) (-0.11) (-2.22) (0.22) 
DIndustry mix  
.021 7.7e-04 -.026 -6.2e-03 -.031 -.041 
(0.93) (0.01) (-0.41) (-0.24) (-0.49) (-0.63) 
*** - 0.01% significance; ** - 0.05% significance; * - 0.1% significance; 
Standard errors adjusted for clusters within the 177 BEA economic areas for S1, 135 BEA economic areas for S2 
and 66 BEA economic areas for S3; t-stat in parentheses; number of observations is 2,238 for S1, 382 for S2 and 
435 for S3. 
Sample 1 (S1) includes nonmetro counties; sample 2 (S2) includes counties in MSAs with 1990 population 
under 500 thousand; sample 3 (S3) includes all other counties. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau population data are used 
for grouping counties into samples. In addition to the control variables reported in Table C1, all models also include 
fixed effects for states, USDA amenity levels and location within 50 kms from Great Lakes, Atlantic Ocean, and 
Pacific Ocean. Full results are available on request from the authors. See the text for further details.	
